Many hardness results in computational social choice make use of the fact that every directed graph may be induced as the pairwise majority relation of some preference profile. However, this fact requires a number of voters that is almost linear in the number of alternatives. It is therefore unclear whether these results remain intact when the number of voters is bounded, as is, for example, typically the case in search engine aggregation settings. In this paper, we provide a systematic study of majority digraphs for a constant number of voters resulting in analytical, experimental, and complexity-theoretic insights. First, we characterize the set of digraphs that can be induced by two and three voters, respectively, and give sufficient conditions for larger numbers of voters. Second, we present a surprisingly efficient implementation via SAT solving for computing the minimal number of voters that is required to induce a given digraph and experimentally evaluate how many voters are required to induce the majority digraphs of real-world and generated preference profiles. Finally, we leverage our sufficient conditions to show that the winner determination problem of various well-known voting rules remains hard even when there is only a small constant number of voters. In particular, we show that Kemeny's rule is hard to evaluate for 7 voters, while previous methods could only establish such a result for constant even numbers of voters.
Introduction
A significant part of computational social choice, a relatively new interdisciplinary area at the intersection of social choice theory and computer science, is concerned with the computational complexity of voting problems. For most of the voting rules proposed in the social choice literature, it has been studied how hard it is to determine winners, to identify beneficial strategic manipulations, or to influence the outcome by bribing, partitioning, adding, or deleting voters (see, e.g., Brandt et al., 2016b; Rothe, 2015; Faliszewski et al., 2009) . In many cases, the corresponding problems turned out to be NP-hard. Depending on the nature of the problem, this can be interpreted as bad newsas in the case of winner determination-or good news-as in the case of manipulation, bribery, and control.
Many voting rules are based on the pairwise majority relation, which establishes a fruitful connection between voting theory and graph theory. Perhaps the most fundamental result in this context is McGarvey's theorem, which states that every asymmetric directed graph may be induced as the pairwise majority relation of some preference profile (McGarvey, 1953) . Unsurprisingly, McGarvey's theorem is the basis of most hardness results concerning majoritarian voting rules. McGarvey's original construction requires n(n − 1) voters, where n is the number of alternatives. This number has subsequently been improved by Stearns (1959) and Erdős and Moser (1964) , who have eventually shown that the number of required voters is of order Θ(n/ log n). Since the result by Erdős and Moser (1964) gives a lower bound as well, it implies that, for any constant number of voters, there are majority digraphs that cannot be induced by any preference profile. 1 As a consequence, the mentioned hardness results only hold if the number of voters is roughly of the same order as the number of alternatives.
In some applications, however, the number of voters is much smaller than the number of alternatives and it is unclear whether hardness still holds. A typical example is search engine aggregation, where the voters correspond to Internet search engines and the alternatives correspond to the webpages ranked by the search engines (see, e.g., Dwork et al., 2001) . Hudry (2008) writes that "to my knowledge, when not trivial, the complexity for lower values of m [the number of voters] remains unknown. In particular, it would be interesting to know whether some of the problems [. . . ] remain NP-hard if m is a given constant". For the particularly interesting case of Kemeny's 1959 rank aggregation rule, there is a notable exception: a proof by Dwork et al. (2001) shows NP-hardness of this rule without needing to appeal to McGarvey's result, and shows that this hardness holds even if there are only 4 voters. The result also holds for every larger even constant number of voters. In the Handbook of Computational Social Choice, Fischer et al. (2016) note that "quite intriguingly, the case for any odd n ≥ 3 remains open". In a similar vein, Hudry (2008) writes that "it would be interesting to decide whether it is still the case for fixed values of m with m odd", and Biedl et al. (2009) find that Dwork et al.'s method "does not work for odd numbers of [voters] " and write that particularly the case for n = 3 remains "wide open".
In this paper, we provide a systematic study of majority digraphs for a constant number of voters resulting in analytical, experimental, and complexity-theoretic insights. Starting from a discussion of bounds on the size of the smallest tournaments that require a certain number of voters (Section 3), we analyze the structure of majority digraphs inducible by a constant number of voters. Obviously, the less voters there are, the more restricted is the corresponding class of inducible majority digraphs. For instance, digraphs induced by two voters have to be acyclic (and are subject to some additional restrictions).
Analytically, we characterize digraphs inducible by two and three voters, respectively, and provide sufficient conditions for digraphs to be induced by k voters (Section 4). We propose a surprisingly efficient implementation via SAT solving for computing the minimal number of voters that is required to induce a given digraph (Section 5) and experimentally evaluate how many voters are required to induce the majority digraphs of real-world and generated preference profiles (Section 6).
In Section 7, we then finally leverage the conditions from Section 4 to investigate whether common, computationally intractable voting rules (the Banks set, the tournament equilibrium set, Kemeny's rule, Slater's rule, and ranked pairs) remain intractable when there is only a small constant number of voters. This is achieved by analyzing existing hardness proofs and checking whether the class of majority digraphs used in these constructions can be induced by small constant numbers of voters. Perhaps surprisingly, it turns out that all hardness proofs we studied can be constructed using at most 11 voters, and for many proofs, including one for Kemeny's rule, 7 voters suffice.
The paper concludes with an overview of the achieved hardness results, summarized in Table 6 , and a brief outlook on future research in Section 8.
Our work can be viewed as complementary to the work by Conitzer et al. (2007) who considered manipulation problems with a constant number of candidates. Conitzer et al. determined how many candidates are required such that the problem of coalitional manipulation with weighted voters becomes NP-hard for a number of tractable voting rules including Borda's rule, Copeland's rule, and maximin.
Preliminaries
This section introduces the notation and terminology required to state our results.
A directed graph or digraph is a pair (V, E), where V is finite a set of vertices and E ⊆ V ×V is a set of arcs (directed edges). The size of a digraph is its number of vertices |V |. By G we denote the class of all digraphs and by G n the class all digraphs of size n. The converse of E is E = {(w, v) : (v, w) ∈ E}, where the direction of all arcs is reversed. Often it will be useful to effectively disregard orientations by considering ← → E = E ∪ E. We say that E 1 and E 2 are orientation compatible if
2 ), i.e., if for all e ∈ ← → E 1 ∩ ← → E 2 , e ∈ E 1 if and only if e ∈ E 2 . The incomparability graphG = (V,Ẽ) associated with a digraph (V, E) is defined such that for all v, w ∈ V , (v, w) ∈Ẽ if and only if neither (v, w) ∈ E nor (w, v) ∈ E.
Obviously, ← → E =Ẽ. A digraph G = (V, E) is said to be transitive if for all x, y, z ∈ V , (x, y) ∈ E and (y, z) ∈ E imply (x, z) ∈ E. Moreover, G is acyclic if for all x 1 , . . . , x k ∈ V , (x 1 , x 2 ), (x 2 , x 3 ), ..., (x k−1 , x k ) ∈ E implies (x k , x 1 ) ∈ E. Also G is asymmetric if (v, w) ∈ E implies (w, v) / ∈ E. A tournament is an asymmetric digraph (V, E) where E is complete, i.e., if for all distinct v, w ∈ V , either (v, w) ∈ E or (w, v) ∈ E. We denote the sets of all tournaments by T and the set of those with n vertices by T n . Moreover, a digraph (V, E) is transitively (re)orientable if there exists a transitive and asymmetric digraph (V, E ′ ) with ← → E ′ = ← → E . E ′ is also referred to as a reorientation of E. The digraphs in this paper are assumed to be induced by the preferences of a set of voters. Let N = {1, . . . , k} be a set of k voters (or an electorate of size k) and V a set of alternatives. The preferences of each voter i are given as linear orders, i.e., transitive, complete, and antisymmetric relations R i over a set of alternatives V . A preference profile R = (R 1 , . . . , R k ) associates a preference relation with each voter. Each preference profile gives rise to a majority relation, which holds between two alternatives v and w if the number of voters preferring v to w exceeds the number of voters preferring w to v. We say that (V, E) is the majority digraph of preference profile R if (v, w) ∈ E if and only if |{i ∈ N : v R i w}| > |{i ∈ N : w R i v}|.
Majority digraphs are asymmetric. Moreover, if the number of voters is odd, the majority digraph is complete and thus a tournament.
We say that (V, E) is k-inducible if (V, E) is the majority digraph for some preference profile involving k voters. Equivalently, we say that (V, E) is a k-majority digraph. 2 As an example, Figure 1 shows a tournament which is induced by a 3-voter profile, and thus this tournament is a 3-inducible majority digraph. We also consider weighted digraphs (V, w), where V is a set of vertices and w : V ×V → Z a weight function assigning weight w(v, w) to the arc (v, w). With a slight abuse of notation we also refer to weighted digraphs as a pair (V, E), where the weight function is subsumed and it is understood that E = {(v, w) : w(v, w) > 0}. We say that a weighted digraph (V, w) is induced by R if for all v, w ∈ V , w(v, w) = |{i ∈ N : v R i w}| − |{i ∈ N : w R i v}|. In this case, (V, w) is a weighted k-majority digraph.
Given a (weighted) digraph we are interested in the minimal number of voters needed such that the digraph represents the (weighted) majority relation of the voters' preferences. This is captured in the majority dimension of the digraph. 3 Formally, the majority dimension of a digraph G = (V, E) or a weighted digraph G = (V, w) is the smallest number of voters in a profile that induces G, i.e., dim(G) = min{k : G is a (weighted) k-majority digraph}.
Also, let k maj (n) denote the minimum electorate size required to induce all digraphs of size n, i.e.,
If we restrict our attention to tournaments, we will write
Conversely, define the majoritarian expressiveness of (electorates of size) k to be the maximum integer n T (k) such that every complete majority relation on up to n T (k) alternatives is k-inducible. Since the work by Erdős and Moser (1964) , which we discuss in more detail in Section 3, it is known that n T (k) is finite for every k. Note that this implies, that the smallest tournament that cannot be induced by k voters is of size n T (k) + 1.
By a voting rule we understand a function that maps each preference profile to a nonempty subset of the alternatives. Over the years, a large number of voting rules have been proposed. The ones we will be concerned with in this paper-because they are based on majority digraphs and computationally intractable-are the Banks set (BA), the tournament equilibrium set (TEQ), Slater's rule (SL), and ranked pairs (RP ) . The definitions of these rules are given in Section 7.
Bounds on the Majority Dimension and Majoritarian Expressiveness
This section is concerned with bounds on the majority dimension of digraphs and on the majoritarian expressiveness of electorates of a fixed size. The first such result is due to McGarvey (1953) , who showed that every digraph can be induced by some (finite) preference profile. He gave a construction that requires exactly two voters per arc in the digraph. In our notation, this implies that k maj (n) ≤ n(n − 1) < ∞ for all n.
The work by McGarvey has been followed up by Stearns (1959) who showed that k maj (n) ≤ n+2 which was later improved by Fiol (1992) to k maj (n) ≤ n−⌊log n⌋+1. For larger n, Erdős and Moser (1964) gave the asymptotically better bound k maj (n) ≤ c· n log n for some constant c. Their work nicely complemented a second result by Stearns (1959) who proved that k maj (n) > 0.55 · n log n for large n. These results together asymptotically capture the growth of k maj (n).
Theorem 1 (Stearns, 1959, Erdős and Moser, 1964) . k maj (n) ∈ Θ( n log n ).
In the following, we are particularly interested in the majority dimension of tournaments. The following simple observation about the parity of dim(G) will be useful.
Lemma 1. The majority dimension dim(G) is odd if G is a tournament and even otherwise.
Proof. Let G be a tournament and assume that dim(G) = k was even. Then there exists a preference profile R with k voters that induces T . Since k is even, the majority margin must be even for every pair of alternatives and can furthermore never be zero as T is a tournament. Therefore, removing any single voter from R gives a profile R ′ with just k − 1 voters that still induces T , a contradiction.
For incomplete digraphs, the statement follows directly from the fact that for all preference profiles R with an odd number of voters k, the majority relation is complete and anti-symmetric (as no majority ties can occur).
Note that the lower bound on k maj (n) due to Stearns (1959) shows that for every electorate of size k, there exist digraphs that are not k-inducible. Still, the majority dimension of tournaments, k T maj (n), could be bounded by a constant. In that case, all tournaments could be inducible by some constant electorate size. The following lemma shows that this is not the case. The argument is similar to the one by Stearns.
Proof. If every tournament on n vertices can be induced by k voters, then for every T ∈ T n , there needs to be at least one k-voter profile that induces T . There are n! possible preference orders over n alternatives, and-when ignoring the identities of voters-the number of k-voter profiles is
. Also, the number of labeled tournaments on n vertices is 2 (
where the last inequality follows from Fiol's bound stated above. The result follows immediately.
Using the lemma, we can search for an upper bound on the majoritarian expressiveness n T (k) for a given k by finding the minimal m such that (1) is violated. Shepardson and Tovey (2009) proved that every tournament that contains a certain digraph of size 8 as a subgraph is not 3-inducible. In Section 6.1, we will argue that there are no smaller tournaments with this property. An example of such a tournament is shown in Figure 2 .
Using an argument by Alon (2006) , one can construct, for any odd k, concrete tournaments that are not k-inducible. Unfortunately, these tournaments turn out to be very large.
Example 1. Consider the quadratic residue tournaments Q p of size p. 5 If p is a prime congruent to 3 (mod 4) and p > 603, 979, 776 then Q p is not 5-inducible.
The argument by Alon (2006) runs along the following lines. A dominating set of a digraph G = (V, E) is a set U ⊆ V such that for all v ∈ V \ U , there exists a u ∈ U with (u, v) ∈ E. Alon (2006) showed that the size of the smallest dominating set of any k-majority digraph for odd k is bounded from above by a function F(k) with F(k) ∈ O(k log k) and F(k) ∈ Ω( k log k ) with rather large constants hidden in the Landau notation (80 for the upper bound). This means that if a given tournament T does not have a dominating set of size F(k), then T is not k-inducible.
This can be leveraged to construct a tournament that is not k-inducible due to the following constructive result by Graham and Spencer (1971) . Let f (x) = p > x 2 2 2x−2 where x is a positive integer and p is the smallest prime congruent to 3 (mod 4) satisfying the inequality (the construction works for any such p). Then, the quadratic residue tournament Q p of size p does not exhibit a dominating set of size x.
Together, this yields, for any odd k, a construction for a tournament on (f • F)(k) vertices that is not k-inducible. Unfortunately, f (x) is exponential in x, and the value of F(k) is known precisely only for k = 3 where we have F(3) = 3. To the best of our knowledge, the best currently available bound for k = 5 is F(5) ≤ 12 (Fidler, 2011) . Together, we get that for the smallest (or any other) prime p congruent to 3 (mod 4) satisfying the inequality p > 12 2 · 2 2·12−2 = 603, 979, 776
Bounds on F(k) for larger odd k give significantly worse values: for 7 voters, we only know that F(7) ≤ 44 (Fidler, 2011) .
Majority Digraphs of Few Voters
In this section, we analyze the structure of k-inducible digraphs for constant k. Building on earlier work by Dushnik and Miller (1941) which entails a characterization of 2-majority digraphs, we give a characterization for the case of three voters. In addition, we present sufficient conditions for larger majority dimensions that will be leveraged in Section 7.
Two and Three Voters
Given a preference profile R, the Pareto relation holds between two alternatives v and w if all voters prefer v over w. Dushnik and Miller (1941) specified sufficient and necessary conditions for relations to be induced as the Pareto relation of a 2-voter profile. As for two voters the majority relation and the Pareto relation coincide, we can rephrase their result for majority digraphs as follows.
Lemma 3 (Dushnik and Miller, 1941) . A majority digraph (V, E) is 2-inducible if and only if it is transitive and its incomparability graph (V,Ẽ) is transitively orientable. Moreover, the weight of every arc is 2.
See Figure 3a for an example of a digraph that is not 2-inducible even though it is transitive. If it was 2-inducible, there would have to exist a transitive reorientation E ′ ofẼ. We can assume without loss of generality that (b, d) ∈ E ′ . But then (a, d) and (e, b) also have to be in E ′ leaving no possibility to orient {a, e} without obtaining a contradiction to the assumed transitivity of E ′ . If, on the other hand, a digraph (V, E) is in fact induced by a 2-voter profile (R 1 , R 2 ), then R 1 and R 2 coincide on E and are opposed onẼ, i.e., R 1 ∩ R 2 = E. As R 1 and R 2 are both transitive, so is E. If E ′ is the respective reorientation ofẼ, then
A digraph (V, E) is an unidirected star if there is some v * ∈ V such that either E or E equals {v * } × (V \ {v * }). Clearly, (V, E) is transitive as there are no v, w, u ∈ V such that both (v, w), (w, u) ∈ E. Moreover, every transitive relation over the leaves of (V, E) serves as a transitive orientation ofẼ. With Lemma 3 this gives us the following result, which is a special case of Lemma 1 by Erdős and Moser (1964) . Another insight that follows from Lemma 3, is that the union of pairwise disjoint digraphs that are induced by 2-voter profiles is also induced by a 2-voter profile.
Proof. Let V = V 1 ∪· · ·∪V k and E = E 1 ∪· · ·∪E k and consider the digraph (V, E). Since each of (V 1 , E 1 ), . . . , (V k , E k ) is 2-inducible, by Lemma 3, each of E 1 , . . . , E k is transitive and each ofẼ 1 , . . . ,Ẽ k is transitively orientable. Let E ′ 1 , . . . , E ′ k be the respective transitive reorientations ofẼ 1 , . . . ,Ẽ k . Since V 1 , . . . , V k are pairwise disjoint, E 1 ∪ · · · ∪ E 2 can readily be seen to be transitive as well. Let furthermore E * = 1≤i<j≤k (V i × V j ). Observe thatẼ =Ẽ 1 ∪· · ·∪Ẽ k ∪Ẽ * and that E ′ 1 ∪· · ·∪E ′ k ∪E * is a transitive reorientation ofẼ. The claim then follows by another application of Lemma 3.
Consequently, every forest of (unidirected) stars such as the one shown in Figure 3b is 2-inducible. 6 Apart from a family of tournaments of order eight that are not k-inducible (Shepardson and Tovey, 2009) , little was known about 3-majority digraphs. In a much similar vein as Lemma 3, we now provide a characterization of these digraphs.
Lemma 6. A tournament (V, E) is 3-inducible if and only if there are disjoint sets E 1 , E 2 with E = E 1 ∪E 2 such that E 1 is transitive and E 2 is both acyclic and transitively reorientable. Then, the weight of every arc in E 1 is either 1 or 3 and that of each arc in E 2 is 1.
Proof. For the if-direction, assume that there are disjoint sets E 1 , E 2 with E = E 1 ∪ E 2 such that E 1 is transitive and E 2 is both acyclic and transitively reorientable. Consider the digraph (V, E 1 ) and observe that for the corresponding incomparability graph (V,Ẽ 1 ),Ẽ 1 = ← → E 2 . It follows thatẼ 1 is transitively orientable and, by Lemma 3, that (V, E 1 ) is induced by a 2-voter profile (R 1 , R 2 ) and that all arcs in E 1 have weight 2. As E 2 is acyclic, there is a (strict) preference relation R 3 with E 2 ⊆ R 3 . Now consider the majority digraph induced by the preference profile (R 1 , R 2 , R 3 ), which apparently coincides with (V, E). E 1 is determined by R 1 and R 2 and each of its arcs obtains weight 1 or 3 depending on whether R 3 agrees with both R 1 and R 2 or not. Moreover, E 2 is determined by R 3 , as R 1 and R 2 can be assumed to specify contrary preferences on this part.
For the only-if-direction, assume that (V, E) is the majority digraph induced by the 3-voter profile (R 1 , R 2 , R 3 ). Let furthermore (V, E 1 ) be the majority digraph induced by (R 1 , R 2 ) and
. By Lemma 3, (V, E 1 ) is transitive and E 1 is transitively (re)orientable, where (V,Ẽ 1 ) is the incomparability graph of (V, E 1 ). Since R 3 is transitive (and strict) E 2 is obviously acyclic. Observe furthermore that
In order to illustrate Theorem 6, again consider the introductory example given in Figure 1 . This digraph is 3-inducible because its arc set can be partitioned into a transitive part and an acyclic and transitively reorientable part (see Figure 4) 
More than Three Voters
Extensions of these results provide useful sufficient conditions for a digraph to be induced by a constant larger number of voters. If the arc set of a digraph can be decomposed into pairwise orientation compatible sets that satisfy the conditions of Lemma 3, the digraph is induced by a profile with two voters per set.
A bilevel graph is the union of a finite number of vertex-disjoint digraphs (V1, E1), (V2, E2), · · · such that each (Vi, Ei) is complete bipartite and unidirected, i.e., there is a partition into vertex sets Vi,1, Vi,2 such that Ei = Vi,1 × Vi,2. 
Proof. Let for each i with 1
be a 2-voter profile that induces (V, E i ). By Lemma 3, for every (v, w) ∈ E i we know that both v R i 1 w and v R i 2 w and for every (v, w) / ∈ E i , v R i 1 w if and only if w R i 2 v. Now consider the preference profile (R 1 1 , R 1 2 , . . . , R k 1 , R k 2 ) and the majority digraph (V, E) it induces. We argue that Next, we show that a similar condition suffices for a digraph to be inducible by a given odd number of voters. 7 Lemma 8. Let (V, E) be a tournament and
Proof. In virtue of Lemma 7 we know that (V,
. Inspection of the proof also reveals that every arc (v, w) ∈ E 1 ∪ · · · ∪ E k has a positive even weight of at least two. As E k+1 is acyclic and asymmetric, there is some (strict) preference relation R k+1 with E k+1 ⊆ R k+1 . Moreover, since E k+1 corresponds to only one voter and every arc in
n = 5 120 ∼ 1.7 · 10 6 ∼ 2.5 · 10 10 12 n = 10 ∼ 3.6 · 10 6 ∼ 4.8 · 10 19 ∼ 6.3 · 10 32 ∼ 9.7 · 10 6 n = 25 ∼ 1.6 · 10 25 ∼ 3.7 · 10 75 ∼ 9.0 · 10 125 ∼ 1.3 · 10 65 n = 50 ∼ 3.0 · 10 64 ∼ 2.8 · 10 193 ∼ 2.6 · 10 322 ∼ 1.9 · 10 305 n = 100 ∼ 9.3 · 10 157 ∼ 8.1 · 10 473 ∼ 7.1 · 10 789 > 10 1332 Table 2 : Number of objects involved in the Check-k-Majority problem for one, three, and five voters.
has a majority of at least two, E k+1 does not have to be orientation compatible with any of E 1 , . . . , E k . It can then easily be seen that the majority digraph induced by
, each arc in which has then weight one.
Determining the Majority Dimension of a Digraph
This section addresses the computational problem of computing the majority dimension. To this end, we define the problem of checking whether a given digraph G is k-inducible, i.e., whether G is a k-majority digraph.
Check-k-Majority

Input:
A digraph G and a positive integer k. Question: Is G a k-majority digraph?
Recall that for a digraph G, whether dim(G) is odd or even depends on whether G is complete (i.e., a tournament) or not, according to Lemma 1. While Check-2-Majority can be solved in polynomial time (Yannakakis, 1982) , the complexity of Check-kMajority remains open for every fixed k ≥ 3.
In the following, we provide an implementation for solving Check-k-Majority. This implementation relies on an encoding of the problem as a Boolean satisfiability (SAT) problem which is then solved by a SAT solver. This technique turns out to be surprisingly efficient and easily outperforms an implementation for Check-3-Majority based on the graph-theoretic characterization in Section 4.
Computing the Majority Dimension via SAT
The number of objects potentially involved in the Check-k-Majority problem are given in Table 2 . It is immediately clear that a naive algorithm will not solve the problem in a satisfactory manner.
Thus, in order to answer Check-k-Majority, we translate the problem to propositional logic (on a computer) and use state-of-the-art SAT solvers to find a solution. At A satisfying instance of the propositional formula to be designed should represent a preference profile that induces the given digraph. We encode the preference profile in question using Boolean variables r i,a,b , which encode whether a R i b, i.e., whether voter i ranks alternative a at least as high as alternative b. We then need to impose the following constraints.
1. All k voters have linear orders over the n alternatives as their preferences.
2. For each majority arc (x, y) ∈ E in the digraph, a majority of voters needs to prefer x over y.
3. For each missing arc (x ⊁ y and y ⊁ x) in the digraph, exactly half the voters need to prefer x over y. 8
For the first constraint, we encode reflexivity, completeness, transitivity, and antisymmetry of the relation R i for all voters i. The complete translation to CNF (conjunctive normal form, the established standard input format for SAT solvers) is given exemplarily for the case of transitivity; reflexivity, completeness, and anti-symmetry are converted analogously:
The key in the translation of the inherently higher order axioms to propositional logic is (as pointed out by Geist and Endriss (2011) already) that due to finite domains, all quantifiers can be replaced by finite conjunctions or disjunctions, respectively.
Majority and indifference implications can be formalized in a similar fashion. We describe the translation for the majority implications here; the procedure for the indifference implications (needed for incomplete digraphs) is analogous. In the following, we denote the smallest number of voters required for a positive majority margin by m(k) := ⌊k · 1 2 ⌋ + 1. Note that, due to the anti-symmetry of individual preferences, for (x, y) ∈ E it suffices that there exist m(k) voters who prefer x to y. In formal terms:
In order to avoid an exponential blow-up when converting this formula to CNF, the standard technique of variable replacement (also known as Tseitin transformation (Tseitin, 1983) ) is applied. Note that the conditions like |M | = m(k) can easily be checked during generation of the corresponding CNF formula on a computer.
Overall, this encoding leads to a total of
variables for the case of tournaments and
variables for incomplete digraphs. The number of clauses is equal to k · (n 3 + n 2 ) + n 2 −n 2
With all axioms formalized in propositional logic, we are now ready to analyze arbitrary digraphs G for their majority dimension dim(G). Before we do so, however, we describe an optimization technique for tournament graphs, which, for certain instances, significantly speeds up the computation.
Optimization through Decomposition of Tournaments
An important structural property in the context of tournaments is whether a tournament admits a non-trivial decomposition (see, e.g., Laslier, 1997; Brandt et al., 2016a) . Brandt et al. (2011) show how these decompositions can be exploited to recursively determine the winners of certain voting rules. In this section, we prove that a similar optimization can be carried out for the computation of the majority dimension dim(G) of a given tournament G. In particular, we show that the majority dimension of a tournament is equal to the maximum of the majority dimension of its components and the corresponding summary.
In formal terms, a non-empty subset C of V is a component of a tournament
Every tournament admits a decomposition that is minimal in a well-defined sense (Laslier, 1997) and that can be computed in linear time (McConnell and de Montgolfier, 2005; Brandt et al., 2011) . Given a particular decompositionC = {C 1 , . . . , C p }, the summary of (V, E) with respect toC is defined as the tournament (C,Ẽ) on the individual components rather than the alternatives, i.e.,
The following lemma enables the recursive computation of dim(G) along the component structure of G.
holds is also easy to see by considering a variant of R in which from each component all but one vertex are chosen arbitrarily and removed. The remaining profile then inducesG. For the other direction, let z = max j {dim(G j ), dim(G)}. We know by Lemma 1 that dim(G) and every dim(G j ) is odd as these are all tournaments. Each G j (andG) has a minimal profile R j (and R, respectively). We can add pairs of voters with opposing preferences to each profile without changing its majority relation. This way, we get profiles R ′j (andR ′ ) that still induce G j (andG, respectively) but now all have the same number of voters z. Now, create a new profile R from R ′ in which R j i replaces alternative j as a segment in R ′ i for each voter i and every alternative j. It is easy to check that R has z voters and still induces G, i.e., dim(G) ≥ z.
We have implemented this optimization and found that many real-world majority digraphs exhibit non-trivial decompositions, speeding up the computation of Sat-Checkk-Majority.
Computational Efficiency
The characterization of 3-majority digraphs in Section 4 allows for a straightforward algorithm, which is expected to have a much better running time than any naive implementation enumerating all preference profiles (also compare Table 2 ). The corresponding Algorithm 5 6 7 8 9 10 20 50 100
Sat < 0.1s < 0.1s < 0.1s < 0.1s < 0.1s < 0.1s 0.1s 1.5s 12.5s 2-Partition < 0.1s < 0.1s 0.1s 530s ----- Table 3 : Comparison of average runtimes of Sat-Check-3-Majority and 2-Partition-Check-3-Majority for randomly sampled tournaments of size n with a cutoff time of one hour.
algorithm 2-Partition-Check-3-Majority is given in Algorithm 2. Besides enumerating all 2-partitions of the majority arcs, the only non-trivial part is to check whether a relation has a transitive reorientation. This can be done efficiently using an algorithm by Pnueli et al. (1971) . We compared the running times of 2-Partition-Check-3-Majority with the ones of our implementation via Sat as described in Section 5.1 (see also Algorithm 1). 9 It turns out that-even though it is much more universal-Sat-Check-3-Majority offers significantly better running times (see Table 3 ). Moreover, Sat-Check-k-Majority directly returns a resulting preference profile with k voters.
Further runtimes, which exhibit the practical power of our SAT approach (and its limits), can be obtained from Table 4 . All experiments were run on an Intel Core i5, 2.66GHz (quad-core) machine with 12 GB RAM using the SAT solver plingeling (Biere, 2013) . Interestingly, an integer programming (IP) formulation of the problem by Eggermont et al. (2013) appears to perform worse than our SAT-based formalization: Eggermont et al. report that for n > 20 runtimes are prohibitively large.
Algorithm 2: 2-Partition-Check-3-Majority Input: tournament (V, E) Output: whether (V, E) is a 3-majority digraph foreach 2-partition {E 1 , E 2 } of E do if E 1 is transitive and E 2 is acyclic and E 2 has a transitive reorientation then return true; end end return false;
Analyzing Majority Dimensions
Using the algorithm described in the previous section, we are now in a position to analyze the majority dimension of digraphs. In this section, we report on our findings for different sources of digraphs. 
Exhaustive Analysis
Using the tournament generator from the nauty toolkit (McKay and Piperno, 2013), we generated all tournaments with up to 10 alternatives and found that all of them are 5-inducible. In fact, all tournaments of size up to seven are even 3-inducible, confirming a conjecture by Shepardson and Tovey (2009) . Shepardson and Tovey also showed that there exist tournaments of size 8 that are not 3-inducible. We also confirmed that the exact number of such tournaments is 96 (out of 6880) as found by Eggermont et al. (2013) . One of these tournaments is depicted in Figure 2 . Like Eggermont et al. (2013), we have not encountered a single tournament for which we could show that it is not 5-inducible. Since quadratic residue tournaments of enormous size are the only concrete tournament of which we know that they have higher majority dimension (see Section 3), we examined small tournaments of this kind as well and found that dim(Q 11 ) = 3 and dim(Q 19 ) = 5.
Unfortunately, we were not able to check whether the majority dimension of Q 23 is equal to 5 or larger as the SAT solver did not terminate within a total of six weeks. 10
Empirical Analysis
In the preference library PrefLib (Mattei and Walsh, 2013) , scholars have contributed data sets from real world scenarios ranging from preferences over movies or sushi via Formula 1 championship results to real election data. Accordingly, the number of voters whose preferences originally induced these data sets vary heavily between 4 and 44, 000. At the time of writing, PrefLib contained 354 tournaments induced from pairwise majority comparisons as well as 185 incomplete majority digraphs. Among the tournaments in PrefLib, 58 are 3-inducible. The two largest tournaments in the data set have 240 and 242 vertices, respectively. The first one is a 5-majority tournament and the Sat solver did not terminate on the second one within one day. The remaining tournaments are transitive and thus 1-inducible. Therefore, all checkable tournaments in PrefLib are 5-inducible.
For the non-complete majority digraphs in PrefLib, we found that the indifference constraints which are imposed on all missing arcs change the picture. Not only does it negatively affect the running time of Sat-Check-k-Majority in comparison to tournaments which made us restrict our attention to instances with at most 40 alternatives, but it also results in higher majority dimensions of up to 8 among the 85 feasible instances.
Stochastic Analysis
Additionally, we consider stochastic models to generate tournaments of a given size n. Many different models for linear preferences (or orderings) have been considered in the literature. We refer the interested reader to Critchlow et al. (1991) , Marden (1995) , Mattei et al. (2012) , and Brandt and Seedig (2014) . In this work, we decided to examine tournaments generated with five different stochastic models.
In the uniform random tournament model, the same probability is assigned to each labeled tournament of size n, i.e.,
In all of the remaining models, we sample preference profiles and work with the tournament induced by the majority relation. In accordance with McCabe-Dansted and Slinko (2006); Brandt and Seedig (2014) , we generated profiles with 51 voters.
The impartial culture model (IC) is the most widely-studied model for individual preferences in social choice. It assumes that every possible preference ordering has the same probability of 1 n! . If we add anonymity by having indistinguishable voters, the set of profiles is partitioned into equivalence classes. In the impartial anonymous culture (IAC), each of these equivalence classes is chosen with equal probability.
In Mallows-φ model (Mallows, 1957) , the distance to a reference ranking is measured by means of the Kendall-tau distance which counts the number of pairwise disagreements. Let R 0 be the reference ranking. Then, the Kendall-tau distance of a preference ranking
According to the model, this induces the probability of a voter having R as his preferences to be Pr(R) = φ τ (R,R 0 ) C where C is a normalization constant and φ ∈ (0, 1] is a dispersion parameter. Small values for φ put most of the probability on rankings very close to R 0 whereas for φ = 1 the model coincides with IC. 11
A very different kind of model is the spatial model. Here, alternatives and voters are placed uniformly at random in a multi-dimensional space and the voters' preferences are determined by the (Euclidian) distanced to the alternatives. The spatial model plays an important role in political and social choice theory where the dimensions are interpreted as different aspects or properties of the alternatives (see, e.g., Ordeshook, 1993; Austen-Smith and Banks, 1999) .
For up to 21 alternatives, we sampled preference profiles (each consisting of 51 voters 12 ) from the aforementioned stochastic models and examined the corresponding majority digraphs for their majority dimension using Sat-Check-k-Majority. The average complexities over 30 instances of each size are shown in Table 5 . We see that the unbiased models (IC, IAC, uniform) tend to induce digraphs with higher majority dimension.
Again, we encountered no tournament that was not a 5-majority tournament. We also checked more than 8 million uniform random tournaments with 12 alternatives. These results could be used to argue that the majority dimension itself may be employed as a parameter to govern the generation of realistic preference profiles.
Hardness of Voting with Few Voters
In this section, we show that the winner determination problem of four well-studied voting rules remains NP-hard even if the number of voters is a small constant. Our general method is to analyze existing hardness constructions for these rules with respect to their susceptibility to the sufficient conditions in Lemma 7 or Lemma 8. In all cases, we slightly modify the hardness constructions to get better bounds on the number of voters. Before we proceed, we introduce two new constrained classes of propositional formula Table 5 : Average majority dimension in tournaments generated by stochastic (preference) models. The given values are averaged over 30 samples each.
(Ordered3-CNF, to be used for the results in Sections 7.1 and 7.2, and ReducedFew-CNF, to be used for the result in Section 7.3) and show for both that the problem of deciding whether a given formula is satisfiable is NP-complete. A formula of propositional logic in conjunctive normal form (CNF) is in 3-CNF if each clause has at most three literals. We say that a formula ϕ from 3-CNF is in Ordered3-CNF if its clauses all contain exactly three distinct literals and are ordered within ϕ in such a way that for each propositional variable p, all clauses containing the literal p precede all clauses containing ¬p. It is known that 3Sat, the problem of deciding whether a given formula in 3-CNF is satisfiable, is NP-complete (Karp, 1972) . For formulae in Ordered3-CNF, we call the corresponding decision problem Ordered3Sat.
Lemma 10. Ordered3Sat is NP-complete.
Proof. Membership in NP is obvious. For hardness, we reduce from 3Sat. Let ϕ be some formula in 3-CNF. Let P denote the set of variables of the propositional language in which ϕ is formulated and let C = (c 1 , . . . , c |C| ) denote the clause set of ϕ. We may assume without loss of generality that no clause contains the same variable twice, that all literals in a clause are ordered according to a fixed ordering (p 1 , p 2 , . . .), and that every clause is of size three. The latter is due to the fact that clauses of size one can be easily used to simplify ϕ and the remaining clauses (p ∨ q) of size two can be padded with a new variable x to (p ∨ q ∨ x) ∧ (p ∨ q ∨ ¬x). We call all variables that occur at least once in ϕ original variables.
For the reduction, we construct an ordered formula ϕ ′ in 3-CNF with 6 · |C| clauses and 4 · |C| additional variables that is satisfiable if and only if ϕ is. For every clause where x i , x ′ i , y i , and z i are new propositional variables. It is easy to check that c i is satisfiable if and only if ϕ i is. Since the literals associated with original variables are spread over different ϕ i just as they were over the different clauses c i in ϕ, this implies that i ϕ i is satisfiable if and only if ϕ is.
What remains to be shown is that all the clauses c j i can be arranged in such a way that the resulting formula is ordered. To this end, we define for each original variable p and j ∈ {1, . . . , 4} the clause sets We are now in a position to define ϕ ′ to be
c.
We claim that ϕ ′ is ordered. We show this for original and new variables separately. For each original variable p, all positive occurrences are in the C p,j , preceding the negative occurrences in the C ¬p,j .
For all new variables, the clauses in C 5 ∪ C 6 only contain negative occurrences and are at the back of ϕ. Therefore, we only have to check that orderedness holds in the first part of ϕ ′ . For each z i , this is trivially the case as it only occurs once (as a positive literal) outside of C 5 ∪ C 6 . For the others that we denoted by x i , x ′ i , and y i , the positive occurrences in C p ℓ ,j ∪ C ¬p ℓ ,j for some ℓ and j ∈ {1, 2, 3} always precede the single negative occurrence in C p L ,J ∪ C ¬p L ,J for some J ∈ {2, 3, 4} and L = ℓ: due to the fixed ordering of the literals within a clause we have that L > ℓ.
We say that a formula from 3-CNF is in Few-CNF if each literal appears at most twice, and each variable appears at most thrice. We call the problem of checking whether a formula given in Few-CNF is satisfiable FewSat. Tovey has shown that FewSat is NP-complete (Tovey, 1984 , Thm. 2.1). We follow his proof to show that this still holds for formulae in ReducedFew-CNF where we additionally require that every variable occurs in at most one three-literal clause and every literal in at most one two-literal clause. Denote the corresponding decision problem by ReducedFewSat.
Lemma 11. ReducedFewSat is NP-complete.
Proof. Membership in NP is obvious. For hardness, we reduce from 3Sat. Let ϕ := n i=1 (x i ∨ y i ∨ z i ) be some formula in 3-CNF where no clause contains the same variable twice. For every variable v occurring in ϕ, replace each of its L occurrences with a new variable v j where 1 ≤ j ≤ L. Now for every v occurring in ϕ, add the clauses
Call the formula resulting from these transformations red(ϕ). Note that red(ϕ) only contains clauses with three literals (original clauses with replaced variables) or two literals (the new clauses); denote these clause sets by C 3 and C 2 , respectively. Also observe that every variable occurs exactly once in C 3 and every literal exactly once in C 2 , i.e., red(ϕ) is in ReducedFew-CNF.
For every old variable v, we can only satisfy ϕ v by setting all v j to the same value. Since setting all v j to the same value t satisfies ϕ v and has the same effect on the original part of red(ϕ) that setting v to t has on ϕ, it follows that ϕ is satisfiable if and only if red(ϕ) is satisfiable.
The Banks Set
The Banks set associates with each majority tournament the maximal elements of its maximal (with respect to set-inclusion) transitive subtournaments (see, e.g., Laslier, 1997; Brandt et al., 2016a) .
Although some alternative in the Banks set can be found in polynomial time using a greedy algorithm (Hudry, 2004) , deciding whether a specific alternative belongs to the Banks set is NP-complete as shown by Woeginger (2003) by a reduction from 3-colorability. Brandt et al. (2010) gave an arguably simpler proof of this result by a reduction from 3Sat: every formula ϕ in 3-CNF can be transformed in polynomial time into a tournament T BA ϕ with a decision vertex c 0 such that c 0 is in the Banks set of T BA ϕ if and only if ϕ is satisfiable. Due to Lemma 10, this reduction works just as well if ϕ is assumed to be ordered. Again, we have P denote the set of variables of the propositional language in which ϕ is formulated.
A tournament (V, E) is in the class G BA if it satisfies the following properties. There is an odd integer m such that,
where C, U 1 , . . . , U m are pairwise disjoint and C = {c 0 , . . . , c m }. We have C i denote the singleton
ϕ for some ϕ in ordered 3-CNF with 1 2 (m + 1) clauses. If i is odd, U i corresponds to a clause of ϕ and the vertices it contains represent (tokens of) literals. We assume each of these vertices u j i to be labeled by the literal λ(u j i ) it represents. For odd i ∈ {1, . . . , m} and j ∈ {1, 2, 3} we define,
Moreover, for even i ∈ {1, . . . , m} and j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we let
We are now in a position to define the arc set E, almost as in Brandt et al. (2010) . 13 Let
where 
we refer to as its skeleton. We will show that the skeleton of each tournament T BA ϕ is induced by a 3-voter profile such that the arcs in E ϕ all get a weight of one. At the same time, E ϕ is 2-inducible such that the weight on all arcs is two. A little reasoning and an application of Lemma 8 then gives us the desired result.
Theorem 2. Computing the Banks set is NP-hard if the number of voters is at least 5.
Proof. Let (V, E) be a tournament in G BA . It suffices to show that (V, E) is induced by a 5-voter profile. To this end define
ϕ , and
13 There is only a slight change compared to the original construction by Brandt et al. (2010) . Specifically, we now have arcs U 1 i × U 3 i instead of the other way around. It is not difficult to check that the argument of the reduction is not affected-it is irrelevant whether the crucial transitive subtournament with c0 as its maximal element may contain one, two, or three vertices from each Ui. 
Figure 5: A tournament T BA ϕ = (V, E) in the class G BA . Omitted arcs point downwards. Moreover, λ(u 3 5 ) = λ(u 3 3 ) = λ(u 3 1 ). The dotted and dashed upward arcs correspond to the arc sets E 1 and E 2 in Theorem 2, respectively. The remaining arcs, i.e., all downward arcs and the arcs within the U i form an acyclic arc set and correspond to E 3 .
Observe that E = E 1 ∪ E 2 ∪ E 3 and that E 1 , E 2 , and E 3 are pairwise disjoint. In virtue of Lemma 8, it therefore suffices to show that (V, E 1 ) and (V, E 2 ) are induced by 2-voter profiles and that (V, E 3 ) is acyclic.
For (V, E 1 ) it is easy to see that it is a union of unidirected stars and therefore 2-inducible. For (V, E 2 ), let
be the arcs in E 2 associated with a variable p. Note that E 2 = p∈P E p 2 and that all E p 2 are vertex-disjoint from each other. Recall that (V, E) was in induced through a construction that was based on an ordered formula. This implies that whenever U
we have that i is greater than j. Therefore, E p 2 can also be written as i,j (U ¬p i ×U p j ). In this representation, it is clear that E p 2 is a complete, unidirected bipartite digraph. But then, E 2 as a vertex-disjoint union of such digraphs is a bilevel graph and 2-inducible according to Lemma 2 by Erdős and Moser (1964) , cf. Footnote 6 on page 9.
To see that E 3 is acyclic, note that it forms a subset of
and corresponds to all (shown) horizontal and (missing) downward arcs in Figure 5 .
The Tournament Equilibrium Set
The tournament equilibrium set (TEQ) is another voting rule that, like the Banks set, selects a subset of alternatives from each tournament (see, e.g., Laslier, 1997; Brandt et al., 2016a) . Its recursive definition is based on the notion of retentiveness. Given a tournament (V, E), a subset X ⊆ V is said to be TEQ-retentive if for all v ∈ X all alternatives chosen by TEQ from the subtournament of (V, E) induced by {w ∈ V : (w, v) ∈ E} are contained in X. TEQ is then defined so as to select the union of the inclusion-minimal TEQ-retentive sets from each tournament. Brandt et al. (2010) have shown that computing TEQ is NP-hard by a reduction from 3Sat. By Lemma 10, the very same construction is also a valid reduction from Ordered3Sat. For every formula ϕ in ordered 3-CNF a tournament T TEQ ϕ can be constructed such that TEQ selects a decision vertex c 0 from T TEQ ϕ if and only if ϕ is satisfiable. The class of these tournaments T TEQ ϕ is denoted by G TEQ and the tournaments in this class bear a strong structural similarity to those in G BA , which can be exploited to show that every tournament in G TEQ is induced by a 7-voter profile.
A tournament (V, E) is in the class G TEQ if it satisfies the following properties. There is an odd integer m with m ≡ 1 (mod 4) such that,
where C, U 1 , . . . , U m are defined the same as in G BA . We have C i denote the singleton {c i }. Moreover, let X = {U i : i ≡ 1 (mod 4)}, Y = {U i : i is even}, and Z = {U i : i ≡ 3 (mod 4)}.
Intuitively, (V, E) is T TEQ ϕ for some ϕ in ordered 3-CNF with 1 4 (m + 3) clauses. Every U i ∈ X corresponds to a clause of ϕ and the vertices it contains represent (tokens of) literals. Again, we assume each of these vertices u j i to be labeled by the literal λ(u j i ) it represents. For i ∈ {1, 5, . . . , m} and j ∈ {1, 2, 3} we define,
Moreover, for the other values of i, and j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we stipulate, We are now in a position to define the arc set E.
where
An example of such a tournament is depicted in Figure 6 . The notable structural differences to G BA are the cycles in U i for odd i and the arcs E z between Z and X. Next, we show that every tournament T TEQ ϕ is induced by a 7-voter profile, using the same approach as in Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. Computing TEQ is NP-hard if the number of voters is at least 7.
Proof. Similar to the proof for Theorem 2, it suffices to show that every tournament (V, E) in G TEQ is induced by a 7-voter profile. To achieve this, we partition E into four disjoint arc sets E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , E 4 ⊆ E and show that the digraphs (V, E 1 ), (V, E 2 ), and (V, E 3 ) are each induced by 2-voter profiles as well as that (V, E 4 ) is acyclic. Then the result follows from Lemma 8.
While the tournaments in G TEQ are very similar to the ones in G BA , the introduction of new vertices and arcs makes finding an appealing partition a bit trickier. We define
, and
It can readily be appreciated that E 1 , E 2 , and E 3 are contained in E (see Figure 7) . Also, they are pairwise disjoint and therefore {E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , E 4 } is proper partition of E. 
The thick arrow on the left represents all arcs i<j {(c j , c i )} being part of E 1 .
To show that (V, E 1 ) is 2-inducible, we define
It is straightforward to check that E ′ 1 is a reorientation ofẼ 1 . Also, it is easy but tedious, by making the obvious case distinctions, to show for E 1 and E ′ 1 that the out-neighborhood of each vertex is contained in the out-neighborhood of each of its inneighbors, implying that E 1 and E ′ 1 are both transitive. 14 For example, consider a vertex
denote the set of all out-neighbors and all in-neighbors of u 1 i in (V, E ′ 1 ), respectively. It is straightforward to check that every vertex in D also has an arc in E ′ 1 to every vertex in D.
Thus, in virtue of Lemma 3, (V, E 1 ) is induced by a 2-voter profile. The proof for (V, E 2 ) being 2-inducible is analogous to the proof of the same statement in the Banks construction (see Theorem 2). This is also where the orderedness of ϕ is exploited.
The digraph (V, E 3 ) is obviously transitive. We also observe that it consists of isomorphic and vertex-disjoint subgraphs (U i ∪ U i−2 , E 3,i ) for i ≡ 3 (mod 4) with
It is sufficient to find a general transitive reorientation E ′ 3,i on such a subgraph because then every completion of i≡3(mod 4) E ′ 3,i is a transitive reorientation ofẼ 3 . We define
This subgraph set is also shown in Figure 8 and it is easy to verify that it is indeed transitive. Figure 8 : The arc set E ′ 3,3 which is part of the reorientation E ′ 3 ofẼ 3 in the proof of Theorem 3. Dotted arcs denote the incomparability subgraph of E ′ 3,3 .
Finally, to see the acyclicity of (V, E 4 ), observe that
and that E 4 is thereby contained in the transitive closure of the ordering 
Slater's Rule and Kemeny's Rule
Slater's rule seeks linear rankings over alternatives that minimally conflict with the pairwise majority relation and returns the maximal elements of these rankings (see, e.g., Laslier, 1997; Brandt et al., 2016a) . Formally, given a tournament (V, E), the Slater score of a linear ranking ≻ of V is the number of pairs (x, y) ∈ V × V such that both x ≻ y and (x, y) ∈ E. A Slater ranking is a ranking ≻ with maximum Slater score. The Slater set consists of all those alternatives v ∈ V that occur at the top of a Slater ranking. There is a close relationship between Slater rankings and feedback arc sets: maximizing the number of agreed-upon pairwise comparison is the same as minimizing the number of arcs of (V, E) that need to be turned around so as to produce a transitive (and so acyclic) tournament. This connection makes it easy to show that computing Slater rankings is NP-hard in general digraphs, since it is well-known that the feedback arc set problem is NP-hard (Garey and Johnson, 1979) . To show NP-hardness of the feedback arc set problem restricted to tournaments was a long-standing open problem, which was then solved independently by Alon (2006) , Conitzer (2006) , and Charbit et al. (2007) . As a consequence, we now know that computing Slater rankings and the Slater set is NP-hard for tournaments (see also Hudry, 2010) .
A close relative to Slater's rule is Kemeny's rule. While Slater's rule only uses the information contained in the pairwise majority relation, Kemeny's rule also takes into account the magnitude of majority comparison, so that the input to Kemeny's rule is a weighted majority tournament. A further difference is that, while Slater's rule is typically used so as to produce a set of winners, Kemeny's rule is typically used to find consensus rankings. Kemeny's rule has very appealing axiomatic properties (Young and Levenglick, 1978) . Let us now formally define Kemeny's rule. Given a weighted digraph (V, w), the Kemeny score of a linear ranking ≻ of V is x≻y w(x, y), and a Kemeny ranking is a ranking with maximum Kemeny score. The Kemeny rule just returns all Kemeny rankings. Again, notice the close connection to the (weighted) feedback arc set problem. Further, notice that Kemeny's and Slater's rules coincide on tournaments where every arc has weight 1.
Let us now analyze the complexity of these two rules in a setting where there is a constant number of voters. For Kemeny's rule, Dwork et al. (2001) showed the problem to be hard even for weighted digraphs induced by a profile of 4 voters. Their reduction contained a small error that was fixed by Biedl et al. (2009) . With the tools we developed in Section 3, we can give a short exposition of this reduction.
Theorem 4. Computing Kemeny's rule is NP-hard if the number of voters is even and at least 4.
Proof. As we noted above, computing Kemeny's rule is equivalent to solving the feedback arc set problem, so we just need to show that this problem remains hard for digraphs inducible by 4-voter profiles. (The case for even n > 4 can be seen by just adding two completely reversed orders to this profile.)
We show this by reduction from feedback arc set on general digraphs. Let (V, E) be an instance of this problem. Now produce a new digraph (V ′ , E ′ ) from (V, E) by subdividing every arc. Thus, for each arc (a, b) ∈ E, introduce a new vertex e ab ∈ V ′ and arcs (a, e ab ) ∈ E ′ and (e ab , b) ∈ E ′ . Formally, V ′ = V ∪ S, where S = {e ab : (a, b) ∈ E} is the set of subdividers, and
This already completes our description of the reduction. We now claim that (V ′ , E ′ ) is 4-inducible, and that the size of the minimum feedback arc set of (V ′ , E ′ ) is the same as that of the original graph (V, E). To see that (V ′ , E ′ ) is 4-inducible, we partition its arcs into two arc-disjoint forests of unidirected stars. Therefore, by Lemmas 4, 5, and 7, we deduce that (V ′ , E ′ ) is 4-inducible. The promised partition is E ′ = E 1 ∪ E 2 , where
The set E 1 contains arcs from original vertices to subdividers, while the set E 2 contains arcs from subdividers to original vertices (see Figure 9 ). It is also easy to see that subdivision preserves the size of the minimal feedback arc set. If F ⊆ E is a feedback arc set of (V, E), then the set F ′ = {(a, e ab ) : (a, b) ∈ F } is a feedback arc set of (V ′ , E ′ ) of the same size (that is, we delete 'half' of every arc of F ). Conversely, a minimal feedback arc set F ′ of (V ′ , E ′ ) will only ever delete one half of an original arc; deleting an arc of (V, E) whenever half of it is deleted in F ′ gives us a feedback arc set of (V, E) of the same size as F ′ .
It is easy to see that Kemeny's rule can be computed in polynomial time for only 2 voters (e.g., both of the input votes are also optimal Kemeny rankings). Thus, the complexity of Kemeny's rule is settled for every constant even number of voters. The complexity for a constant odd number of voters was open. We now establish that both Kemeny's and Slater's rules are hard for 7 voters or more.
To do this, we will analyze the reduction by Conitzer (2006) showing hardness of the feedback arc set problem restricted to tournaments. Conitzer gives a reduction from MaxSat, which asks for an assignment to the propositional variables in a Boolean formula ϕ such that at least a given number s 1 of clauses is satisfied. Due to Lemma 11, we can constrain ϕ to be in ReducedFew-CNF without affecting the correctness of Conitzer's reduction. The reduction is based on tournaments T SL ϕ that admit a Slater ranking with at most s 2 inconsistent arcs if and only if an assignment for ϕ with at least s 1 satisfied clauses exists, where s 2 depends (polynomially) on ϕ and s 1 .
Let G SL denote the class of all tournaments T SL ϕ obtained from a Boolean formula ϕ in ReducedFew-CNF according to this construction. A tournament (V, E) is in the class G SL if it satisfies the following properties. There exist integers m, l ≥ 1, such that
where C and all T j i are pairwise disjoint and for 1 ≤ i ≤ m C = {c 1 , . . . , c |C| },
) has to be a transitive component, i.e., it is a linear order and for a vertex v ∈ V \ T j i and vertices and
For (V, E) to be in G SL , the arc set has to be of the form
So for every clause c j and every variable λ(T i ), the c j vertex points to exactly three of the six vertices in T i , but which three vertices are pointed to depends on whether and how the variable appears the clause. 15 An illustration of a tournament in G SL is depicted in Figure 10 .
15 The tournaments T SL ϕ that we have defined differ very slightly from those used in the original reduction t 1 Figure 10 : A schematic of a tournament T SL ϕ to illustrate the three different cases for the arcs between T 2 ∪T 3 ∪T 4 ∪T 5 and C. These arcs are shown as dashed and are the only ones that depend on ϕ. The thick arrows below and above indicate the fixed order between and within the T j i , and in between the c i -they stand for the following implicit, undepicted arcs: the arcs (c i , c j ) for i < j, the arcs in T i × T j for i < j, and the arcs in {t
Theorem 5. The problems of computing the Slater set and of computing a Kemeny ranking are NP-hard if the number of voters is at least 7.
Proof. Let (V, E) be a tournament in G SL that is constructed from a formula ϕ in ReducedFew-CNF whose set of clauses C = C 2 ∪ C 3 is partitioned into clauses in C 2 that contain exactly two literals and clauses in C 3 that contain exactly three literals. We give a transitive (1-inducible) arc set E 1 and 2-inducible arc sets E 2 , E 3 , E 4 such that putting these four profiles together yields a profile with 7 voters that induces (V, E) as its majority relation, and moreover, so that the majority margins are all equal to 1. This gives the desired result. (Conitzer, 2006) . In the case that ¬λ(Ti) ∈ cj, the original reduction uses arcs (cj , t 
The set E 1 is complete and transitive: it is induced by the 1-voter profile R 1 whose voter has order t 1
The set E 2 is a bilevel graph, and thus 2-inducible (see Footnote 6) by a profile R 2 of 2 voters. The sets E 3 and E 4 are also 2-inducible by profiles R 3 and R 4 , since E 2 and E 3 both consist of vertex-disjoint unidirected stars (to see disjointness one appeals to the definition of ReducedFew-CNF: every variable occurs at most once in C 3 , and every literal occurs at most once in C 2 ). Now, notice that the sets E 2 , E 3 , E 4 are pairwise disjoint, although certain arcs (from (C 2 ∪ C 3 ) × (T 2 ∪ T 3 )) in E 2 occur once in the opposite direction in E 3 or E 4 . Thus, we can see that the union of the profiles R 2 , R 3 , and R 4 induces the following arcs with weight 2, and all other arcs with weight 0:
But this is precisely the set of arcs on which the intended arc set E and the transitive set E 1 disagree! Hence adding R 2 , R 3 , and R 4 to the 1-voter profile R 1 precisely fixes these disagreements, and induces our target tournament (V, E). Also notice that all majority margins have weight 1. The profile constructed has 7 voters, as required.
Ranked Pairs
The fourth and final voting rule we investigate is called ranked pairs (RP ) (see, e.g., Fischer et al., 2016) . In contrast to the other rules we discussed in the previous sections, it operates on weighted digraphs and, just like Slater's rule, does not require the digraph to be complete. Hence, we have separate results for an odd and for an even number of voters. There are two versions of RP commonly discussed in the literature. The one we are concerned with is the neutral one, i.e., the one that does not differentiate among alternatives. Deciding whether a given alternative is a winner according to this version of RP is NP-complete (Brill and Fischer, 2012) .
Usually, RP is regarded as a procedure. First, one defines priorities for all pairs of alternatives, and then ranks the alternatives iteratively in the order of their priority. The priority over pairs (a, b) of alternatives is given by the number of voters who prefer a to b. To avoid creating cycles, any pair whose addition would yield a cycle is discarded in the procedure. The neutral version of RP , which was defined by Tideman (1987) and considered by Brill and Fischer (2012) , returns the set of all rankings the above procedure returns for some tie breaking rule. From this point on, we refer to this variant by RP .
The NP-hardness proof by Brill and Fischer (2012) is by a reduction from Sat. For each Boolean formula ϕ in CNF they constructed a weighted digraph G RP ϕ such that a decision vertex d is selected by RP from G RP ϕ if and only if ϕ is satisfiable. The construction, of course, works just as well for a reduction from 3Sat. We may also assume that in every formula ϕ in 3-CNF no variable occurs more than once in each clause.
Since the original construction by Brill and Fischer (2012) does not yield a tournament, investigating it would give only results involving an even number of voters. However, a minor modification of the argument results in a tournament, which allows to consider the case of an odd number of voters. We first define the class G RP in which the weighted digraphs G RP ϕ for formulas ϕ in 3-CNF are contained. Then we prove that every digraph in this class is induced by an 8-voter profile, showing that deciding whether a given alternative is a ranked pairs winner is already NP-complete for eight voters. Later, we define the tournament class T RP and show the same result for an odd number of voters. Finally we combine these two results into a corollary.
A weighted digraph (V, E) (with weight function w) belongs to G RP if and only if it satisfies the following conditions. There are some integers m, l ≥ 1 such that Moreover, E = E σ ∪ E ϕ , where E σ (the skeleton) and E ϕ (the formula dependent part) are disjoint such that
(u and E ϕ is such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m and all 1 ≤ j ≤ l:
i.e., every vertex in X has at most three incoming arcs (intuitively corresponding to the literals x contains) and at most one from every U i (intuitively corresponding to the fact that no propositional variable occurs more than once in each clause). Finally, we check that the weight function w is defined such that all arcs in E ∩ ((U 2 × U 3 ) ∪ (U 4 × U 1 )) have weight 4 and all arcs in E \ ((U 2 × U 3 ) ∪ (U 4 × U 1 )) have weight 2. An example illustrating this definition of the class G RP is shown in Figure 12 . Since G RP ϕ is incomplete, it can only be induced by a profile involving an even number of voters. In fact, we will prove that only eight voters suffice to induce any digraph in G RP .
Theorem 6. Deciding whether a given alternative is a ranked pairs winner is NPcomplete if the number of voters is even and at least 8.
Proof. Membership in NP follows from the fact that it is easy to verify whether a given ranking can be the outcome of the RP procedure, independently of the number of voters.
For hardness, let (V, E) be a digraph (with weight function w) in G RP . Intuitively, (V, E) = G RP ϕ for some formula ϕ in 3-CNF. It suffices to show that (V, E) is induced by an 8-voter profile. As an auxiliary notion, let for each 1 ≤ j ≤ l, 
Figure 13: The sets E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , and E 4 for the digraph of Figure 12 as defined in the proof of Theorem 6. may conclude that also the digraph (V, E) with its weights is induced by the 8-voter profile R.
The original hardness construction contained arcs with weights 2 or 4 and unspecified arcs, defining a priority over the arcs. It is easy to see that increasing all weights in such a digraph by 1 to 3 and 5 does not change this priority. Similarly, adding arcs with weight 1 is not harmful as the corresponding pairs are added to the bottom of the priority, making them irrelevent to determining whether d is an RP winner or not. Therefore, by incorporating these observations into G RP ϕ , for each Boolean formula ϕ in 3-CNF, we can create a weighted tournament (call it T RP ϕ ) from which d is selected by RP if and only if ϕ is satisfiable. We denote the class of weighted tournaments that consist of these T RP Voting rule NP-hard for n ≥ Banks set 5 voters Tournament equilibrium set 7 voters Slater's rule 7 voters Kemeny's rule 7 voters Ranked pairs 8 voters (n = 9) Table 6 : Numbers of voters for which winner determination is NP-hard. The Banks set and the tournament equilibrium set are defined for an odd number of voters only.
Furthermore, note that there are some arcs in common among the arc sets and that E ′ 6 is not orientation compatible with E ′ . Arcs in E ′ σ ∩ (U 2 × U 3 ) occur in E ′ 1 , E ′ 2 , and E ′ 6 ; arcs in E ′ σ ∩ (U 4 × U 1 ) occur in E ′ 1 , E ′ 2 , and E ′ 5 while E ′ 6 includes arcs in the opposing direction or, equivalently, includes
6 and exactly one of the other arc sets; and, finally, arcs in E ′ σ c occur only in E ′ 6 . Thus, arcs in E ′ σ ∩ ((U 2 × U 3 ) ∪ (U 4 × U 1 )) have weight 5, arcs in (E ′ ϕ ∪ E ′ σ ) \ ((U 2 × U 3 ) ∪ (U 4 × U 1 )) have weight 3, and arcs in E ′ σ c have weight 1. Therefore, we may conclude that (V, E ′ ) together with its weights is induced by the 11-voter profile R.
Corollary 1. Deciding whether a given alternative is a ranked pairs winner is NPcomplete if the number of voters is either 8 or at least 10.
Proof. This follows from Theorems 6 and 7.
Conclusion and Future Work
Many hardness results in computational social choice only hold if the number of voters is roughly of the same order as the number of alternatives. In some applications of voting, however, the number of voters can be much smaller than the number of alternatives and it is unclear whether hardness still holds.
We gave complete characterizations of 2-inducible and 3-inducible majority digraphs, respectively, and provided sufficient conditions for k-inducible majority digraphs. Using an implementation based on SAT solving, we showed that majority digraphs of realworld and generated preference profiles are inducible by at most eight voters. We did not encounter a single tournament that is not 5-inducible. 16 We then leveraged the sufficient conditions we obtained earlier to show that winner determination for the Banks set, the tournament equilibrium set, Slater's rule, Kemeny's rule, and ranked pairs remains hard even when there is only a small constant number of voters. This was achieved by analyzing existing hardness proofs and checking whether the class of majority digraphs used in these constructions can be induced by small constant numbers of voters. Our hardness results are summarized in Table 6 .
We believe there is some very interesting potential for future work. First, it would be desirable to completely characterize the sets of digraphs inducible by four, five, or more voters. Second, the complexity of checking whether a given majority digraph is k-inducible is wide open for any fixed k ≥ 3. Finally, our techniques can be used to verify whether other existing hardness proofs in computational social choice remain intact for a bounded number of voters, most notably hardness shields against manipulation, bribery, and control. 17 
